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THOMAS FAIR NEBLETT*

International Mediation and Conciliation
A Permanent Function
This is a proposal to establish within the present framework of the
United Nations a permanent subsidiary service to facilitate the
condut ting of negotiations between nations in conflict. The function of
this sen ice would be to provide qualified mediators and conciliators
recruited from all over the world, and prepared for assignment as each
need arose. The objective is prompt and efficient handling of disputes
in their early stages.
The idea amounts to what could be called the "International
Mediation and Conciliation Service."
The salient feature of this proposal is that mediation service would
be provided quietly but swiftly by the United Nations and before
conflict reached the stage of public debate. Mediation and conciliation
would thus become the instrumentality, at working level, for resolving
disputes, those now existing and those most likely to occur. This would
be particularly true among the new countries recently admitted to the
United Nations, and also those struggling for independence.
Another important feature is that no revision of the Charter would
be necessary.
The question involved is: "How do we make Article 33 work
continuously?" This proposal would attempt to advance toward the
answer by: calling attention to the unsolved problems; profiting from
experiences to date; calling for re-affirmation of Article 33*; implementing it with a service of competent creative mediators to guide and
assist the parties; emphasizing that this is a permanent continuing
function and not an occasional requirement; gaining acceptance of the
"third party" approach; providing arbitrators upon joint request of the
parties; cooperating in the development of regional arrangements, or
other peaceful means, both temporary and contractual, where such are
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consistent with UN policy; supporting the judicial settlement commitments and studying the judicial vs non-justiciable disputes handling for
purpose of definition and clarification of procedures; exploring the
establishment of special UN assistance in mediating and arbitrating
disputes between a government and foreign investors; recognizing and
encouraging the hundreds of examples of "good offices" and "third
party" informal conciliative efforts by UN missions and agencies and
nations' representatives; performing any other disputes settlement
service when called upon by an organ or agency of the UN.
This proposal would, of course, recognize that the primary
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security
rests with the Security Council. It is not necessary to take away any
powers from it or any of the other existing organs, nor to delegate such
powers to the service. The latter would become a new supporting staff
arm, created to settle disputes on a case-by-case basis. It would perform
a single specialized function.
This new service would not detract from the function and activity
of these organs. The purpose would be to bolster their effectiveness,
especially the Secretariat, which has performed admirably. Case-load
pressures and other spotlight tensions would be diminished or perhaps
prevented. This would permit these organs to concentrate on their
agenda.
The service would function apart from the six main organs of the
UN, but would be responsive to all of them. It would reflect their
views.
The proposed service would have no policy function. It would
operate under rules of procedure concurred in by the interested organs.
An administrative staff, probably located within the Secretariat, would
carry out procedures and function in accordance with these rules. This
would include the recruitment and assignment of mediators and
conciliators. The cost would be modest. Mediating personnel would be
used mainly on an ad hoc basis. The bulk of the personnel would be
compensated only when actually engaged. Once qualified and cleared,
these persons would be listed on a stand-by panel.
As disputes arise, they could be referred to the service by one of
the organs, or by a member or a non-member nation, or by one of the
specialized agencies, or from any other source recognized by the UN.
The treatment of each case would vary, and be tailored to recognize
conditions peculiar to that particular case. For every lock there is a key;
and this proposal would put a qualified staff to work, all over the
world, in search for the key where a locked door appeared.
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Rationale and Supporting Data

There is a need for this service. The demands upon the United
Nations organization and their agencies have been tremendous. These
demands increase with the birth of new nations and the addition of new
members.
The need for strengthening and implementing the United Nations'
mediation processes have been pointed out frequently by authorities
and scholars both inside and outside the United Nations.
Experience to Date

Experiences in the handling of actual cases by the United Nations,
its organs, its subsidiaries, various individual mediators and commissions
have led to similar proposals. This proposal grows out of these
experiences.
The Secretariat has been called upon in most cases to locate
personnel to serve the UN. This has always been on an ad hoc basis and
usually within the atmosphere of debate and tension characteristic of a
crisis. The Secretary-General has often served in person. UnderSecretary Ralph Bunche, Jr. has served with distinction.
One of the risks which often occurs in such mediation service by
an "office" is that the incumbent or the office may be attacked by
dissenters. This could be fatal to the officer. So much so was the case of
Trygve Lie that he resigned. The office could be seriously affected. So
much was the case of Dag Hammarskjold that the Secretariat itself and
all its work was put in jeopardy. He was on a mediation mission when
he went away. The expectation of this proposal is that mediation may
be conducted in such a way that attackers will find a less likely target.
This would be less risk to the life and growth of UN.
Before leaving the heading of experience, a lesson should be
clearly established by the past experience of almost every conciliator
and mediator: he is expendable.
Ample precedent exists for these organs to delegate these
mediative functions. From the beginning, the Security Council and the
Assembly appointed variously titled committees, "good offices,"
commissions and individual mediators. This policy and procedure has
continued on an ad hoc basis. Experiences in the questions involving
Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Korea, The Balkans, and Palestine are
examples of referral of a dispute by the Security Council or the
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Assembly to a commission, a committee, a "good office" or to an
individual mediator for mediation follow-up.
In the India-Pakistan case, the Commission recommended its own
dissolution in favor of an individual mediator, stating its doubts "as to
whether a five-member body is the most flexible or desirable
instrument."
The Security Council, acting upon advice of the Assembly
unanimously decided early that "should an appropriate occasion arise"
it would use the services of a conciliator, or a "rapporteur," to meet
informally with the parties at the outset to secure agreement.
It has been the practice for the Council to impose upon the "good
offices" of an agency or official to serve as mediator, as in the
Dutch-Indonesian case.
The International Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation was established by the General Assembly in 1949. The Panel was activated but used
only once. Frank P. Graham was appointed from the Panel by the
Security Council to mediate the India-Pakistan question.
In the past the Council and the Assembly have referred cases back
for direct negotiation. In certain cases this has resulted in a freezing of
positions.
No Substantive Change Proposed
Under this proposal the Security Council and Assembly would
continue to mediate and conciliate. These organs would not relinquish
their authority. They would continue their function as now. Cases
would continue upon their agenda. A case might be recalled from the
service for special consideration by one of the organs.
It is our opinion that mediation can function with better results in
a more liquid atmosphere than exists today in either Council or
Assembly chambers-and that frequently best results could occur
before the issue is debated in public.
One observer pointed out that, under the present set of procedures, the majority of disputes undergo a crystallization before reaching
the Security Council. Most qualified mediators agree that public and
general debate has limited value except as a last resort.
This suggests that in a case of prolonged negotiations in a dispute
adamantly deadlocked, the Security Council recommendations or
General Assembly resolutions might be used as a final step. If the
mediation process were made to lead up to a public hearing and
reinforced by the moral impact of world opinion, it could strengthen
International Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2
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the mediation process all along the line. Ultimately a prolonged or
obstinate situation if unsettled could be brought to the Council or the
Assembly for such action.
The basis of this proposal is that a great deal could be
accomplished initially in a case by individuals with broad experience in
mediation. They would continue discussions and explorations of the
various alternatives incident to possible settlement.
It is well known that flexibility and versatility are the essence of
the mediation art and process. Committees or Commissions would
continue to be used where preferable to the single mediator.
Time Saving Value
We believe that under this proposal the United Nations could
avoid some of the lengthy debate, alignment and realignment necessary
under its rules to secure a resolution on certain cases; and it might avoid
various irritations and tensions, with subsequent statements for public
consumption, that do little good from the standpoint of reaching an
agreement.
Staffing the Panel
Qualified men are available. The Secretariat has proved resourceful
in locating persons for emergency service, as the record shows. As long
ago as 1949, recruitment commenced for the Panel for Inquiry and
Conciliation. Twenty-seven nations submitted nominations.
A precedent for recruiting such a panel was set by the permanent
Court of International Arbitration. In that case the function was
arbitration. That experience of using a master panel of available
arbitrators suggests a practical method of finding competent men.
The actual assignment or selection of the person or persons to
serve would be handled by the service.
After a panel is set up the best method for assignment to a case
would be selection by agreement of the parties. In the event special
qualifications are required in a case and such are not found among
panel members, then a special mediator would be recruited.
Judicial vs Non-Justiciable
There is a vast area which now exists on the one hand between the
public debate and formal procedures currently employed by the
Security Council, and the Assembly; and on the other hand the more
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judicial, but rarely used, procedures of the Court of Justice. This will be
an area jurists will watch carefully. The past activity of the Secretariat
in this area would be bolstered and expanded by this proposal. It would
not interfere with legal procedures, but simply assist negotiation.
A dispute might turn out to be purely judicial in character, such as
the interpretation of a treaty. In that case, it would be within the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Or it might be a split
case, partly judicial and partly non-justiciable. The judicial part could
be handled by the Court of Justice, the other by the proposed service.
The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace, headed by
Professor Arthur N. Holcombe, takes cognizance of reluctance by
certain powers to go to the International Court of Justice. The
Commission reports (Thirteenth Report, January, 1961) that international law is a result rather than a cause of progress toward ordering
relationships. This Study Commission says the United Nations is not so
much a means of achieving world order as a product of advances toward
order. This suggests a stepping up of the pragmatic approach, more
discussions and settlements of differences by mediation in case after
case.
Special Arrangements
Through the pact at Bogotdi, the Organization of American States
provided for the peaceful settlement of disputes in the region affected;
and proposed a Commission of Investigation and Conciliation, with a
Permanent Panel of American conciliators.
Regional arrangements of this sort might be encouraged at the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the SEATO, the O.A.S. and
elsewhere.
Secretary General Hammarskjold made a special speech toward the
end of his busy career to recommend the establishment of procedures
to settle disputes between member nations and foreign investors.
Donald B. Straus, President of the American Arbitration Association,
has pursued this with vigor and with much accomplishment.
The service could be of creative assistance in these types of special
arrangements. It would cooperate with those established.
Form

The form which the service takes and the place it fills in the
United Nations organizational chart should cause no controversy. It
International Lawyer, Vol. 3, No. 2
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would be staff in function and could very well take its place along with
other subsidiaries in the Secretariat. There might be a Director in charge
and suitable office personnel.
If necessary to gain acceptance of the proposal or to clear
mediators there might be provided a Supervisory Board or Advisory
Board. This Board would be comprised of such representatives of the
organs, the blocks or the regions as may be necessary to render the
service acceptable and effective.
Adoption Procedure
The Security Council or the General Assembly, either one or both,
have the power to adopt the proposal. No revision of the Charter is
required. It might be preferable, if possible, to approach consideration
with the view to having the Assembly recommend a properly worded
resolution to the Council for adoption.
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